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This article analyses the Baltic policy 
of united Germany from the 1990s until to-
day. The authors set out to identify the sig-
nificance of German-Baltic relations and 
the role of the Eastern policy in Russian-
German relations.  The method of dynamic 
comparison between the political and eco-
nomic narrative in intergovernmental rela-
tions makes it possible to identify distincti-
ve features of Germany’s Baltic policy in 
the context of current international rela-
tions. In particular, it is noted that Germa-
ny was most active in the Baltic region in 
the 1990s, when the country was establishing 
political, economic, and cultural ties with 
the new independent states. In the second 
half of the 1990s, Germany’s foreign policy 
became less intense. After the accession of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the EU 
and NATO in 2004, certain disagreements 
started to arise between Germany and the 
Baltics. It explains the lukewarm relations 
between them. The Ukraine events brought 
about a change in Germany’s regional po-
licy. Despite Russia remaining one of the 
key economic and political counteractors, 
Germany, being a partner of the Baltics in 
the EU and NATO, cannot adopt a neutral 
position in the conflict of interests between 
the Baltics and Russia. 
 
Key words: Germany’s foreign policy, 
Baltics, EU, NATO, Nord Stream, Baltic 
Sea region, Russia 
 
 
The history of relations between the 
unified Germany and the three Baltic 
States — the topic of this article — be-
gins in August 28, 1991. On this day, 
several days after the recognition of the 
independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia by the Russian Soviet Federa-
tive Socialist Republic, the three Baltic 
countries were recognised as independ-
ent states by Germany and the four 
countries established official diploma-
tic relations. In the first years after their 
gaining independence, the Baltics’ go-
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vernment circles expected two possible models to be used by Germany in the 
region. On the one hand, there were concerns about the resumption of the 
Drang nach Osten policy. On the other hand, Germany was seen by many as a 
natural counterweight to Russia, an ‘advocate of the Balts’1 defending the in-
terests of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia both in the West and the East. The Ger-
man presence in the Baltics was viewed by the Baltics’ government circles as a 
tool to overcome dependence on Russia and forge strong military, economic, 
and political ties with the West. [1, S. 21—22] The reality was different. 
Until the early 1990s, Germany’s policy towards the Baltics was rather 
moderate. The German government’s careful official attitude towards Lithu-
ania, Latvia, and Estonia was explained by the disinclination to weaken the 
position of President Gorbachev in the USSR, which could have postponed 
or even terminated the process of Germany’s reunification. [4, S. 137] After 
the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there 
were seemingly no reasons for the German Federative Republic to refrain 
from activities in the Baltics. 
In 1991—1992, relations between the Baltic States and Germany were 
rapidly developing. Several weeks after the establishment of official diplo-
matic contacts, ambassadors were sent to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 
Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who arrived 
in Estonia on September 11, 1991, was the first top European politician to 
pay an official visit to the Baltics after independence. During his visit,  
H-D. Genscher reassured the Baltic leadership that the German government 
was interested in developing relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
and would facilitate the return of the Baltics into the international community. 
H-D. Genscher also declared Germany’s commitment to support a conver-
gence between the Baltics and the EU. [6, S. 67] H-D. Geschner’s words 
were backed by actions: Germany played an active role in the Baltics’ acces-
sion to the CSCE, Council of Europe, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 
and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). 
Alongside facilitating the integration of the Baltics into the Western in-
stitutions, Germany provided different types of assistance to Lithuania, Lat-
via, and Estonia. In 1992-1994, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs al-
located DM 30 million to the Baltics for the construction of a border control 
system [7, S. 101] and DM 125 million within the transformation pro-
gramme. [8, S. 174] As to military cooperation, the Baltics received assis-
tance in personnel training. Material assistance was insignificant and very 
selective. In 1992, the Baltic armed forces received communications equip-
ment, medical supplies, trucks, and mine detectors from the warehouses of 
the former People’s Army of the GDR. A very limited number of weapons 
were supplied in order not to provoke Russia. [12, S. 474] Cooperation in 
                                                     
1 Apparently, the phrase Anwalt der Balten (the advocate of the Balts) was coined by 
Hans-Dieter Lucas and it appeared in the media in 1993. It was often used by the 
German Ministers of Foreign Affairs H-D.Genscher and К.Kinkel. Germans inter-
preted their role of the ‘advocate of the Balts’ as readiness to facilitate the integra-
tion of the Baltics into the western institutions. [9, р. 197]  
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science and culture was rapidly developing between the FRG and the Bal-
tics. In the early 1990s, German research foundations and academic organi-
sations opened offices in the Baltics. These were DAAD (German Academic 
Exchange Service), DFG (German Research Society), the Goethe Institute, 
the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, etc. [9, р. 163] As to the economy, 
in 1991—1993, Germany focused on assisting the Baltics in privatisation 
and increasing economic competitiveness. Assistance was provided in the 
form of trainings for administrative staff and financial support programmes. 
In the framework of the so-called Technical Cooperation and Mutual Assis-
tance Programme, Germany granted Estonia DM 13 m in 1993 (13 m in 
1993), Latvia — DM 13.3 m (13 m in 1993), and Lithuania — DM 14 m 
(1993, 20.4 m). [9, р. 163] 
In their turn, the Baltics did not only strive to adopt German practices in 
different fields, but they also considered Germany as one of preferable state-
hood models. Estonia was most successful in adopting German practices. Its 
administrative, legal, and banking systems were largely based on German 
practices and expertise. However, this gravitation towards Germany particu-
larly pronounced in the 1990s was gradually fading out. In the early 2000s, 
the Baltics ceased to consider Germany as a mode for their socio-political 
development. 
Germany’s interest in the region was also decreasing. The short post-
independence period of active cooperation, when contacts were established 
in numerous areas, was followed by a pragmatic assessment of relations with 
the region. From the economic perspective, the Baltics were not very attrac-
tive to Germany due to their small size and limited economic potential. From 
the perspective of sociocultural ties, the region did not have considerable 
significance, since the German minority — a strong link between Germany 
and the Baltics before World War II — was not sizeable. 
In the mid-1990s, Germany faced a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, 
the country recognised its historical responsibility for the Baltic States and 
showed solidarity with them. On the other, relations with Russia took prior-
ity over cooperation with the Baltics. As a result, the German-Baltic rela-
tions largely depended on Germany’s policy towards Russia. More than on-
ce, they were tested for compatibility with the ‘Russian issue’. 
The first test was the withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops from the Bal-
tics. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia considered the presence of these troops 
on their territory a threat to their integrity and security. [6, p. 66] However, 
the Baltics did not have either sufficient funds or political will to interest 
Russia in withdrawing its troops. As a result, they turned to the West for 
support. From the perspective of the German leadership, the withdrawal of 
Russian troops was necessary to ease the tension in the region. Moreover, it 
was in line with the national interest of Germany, since units of the western 
Group of Forces remained on its territory. The German government sup-
ported Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia demanding that Russia withdraw 
troops from the Baltics as soon as possible. At the same time, Germany 
called for the governments of the Baltics to closely cooperate with Russia on 
security issues. To persuade Moscow to expedite the withdrawal of troops, 
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Germany and other western countries had to seek compromises. For in-
stance, Latvia and Estonia granted Russia a permission to continue the ex-
ploitation of military facilities on their territories until August 31, 1994. 
Another critical point in German-Baltic relations was the republics’ ac-
cession to the EU and NATO. From the very beginning, Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia strived for accession to the EU and NATO. The Baltics consid-
ered Germany as a key to these organisations. In effect, Germany’s position 
was rather moderate. The country opposed the idea of speedy access of the 
Baltics to NATO. The official objectives of German foreign policy in the 
region did not contradict those in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They sug-
gested support for reforms, guarantees for independence and integrity of the 
Baltics, and their integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. [1, S. 166] 
However, despite the fact that the major interests of Germany and the Baltics 
coincided, differences in understanding how and when these objectives can 
be achieved became evident in the early 1990s. [1, S. 216] 
At first, the accessions of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the EU and 
NATO were discussed separately. The Baltics’ priority was their accession 
to NATO, which they viewed as a guarantee for independence and integrity. 
The Baltics’ governments considered the EU only as an economic associa-
tion. It soon turned out that Russia did not object to the Baltics’ EU member-
ship. However, their NATO membership was regarded as a threat to Russia’s 
security and the country’s interests in the region. 
NATO enlargement was one of Germany’s key priorities in the realm of 
security. Thus, the Federative Republic showed considerable initiative in this 
issue. However, for the German government, enlargement meant the acces-
sion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO. The German 
leadership believed the Central European states to be more important for the 
country’s security than the three Baltic Republics. Moreover, the potential 
NATO membership of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary was not a 
threat to Russian-German partnership. [9, P. 196] The German government 
did not oppose the accession of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to NATO. At 
the same time, it did not insist on accelerating this process. [10, S. 8] More-
over, the Baltic dimension was not the primary focus of Germany’s ‘eastern 
policy’, which is indicated by the fact that the relations with the Baltics were 
supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the Chancellor, 
who was traditionally responsible for bilateral relations with the countries con-
sidered as most important for Germany — the US, France, Russia, and some 
others. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel (1992—1998) 
identified the Baltics’ accession to the EU a key priority for his Ministry. 
However, even during his time in office, negotiations on the Baltics’ NATO 
membership progressed slowly. Under Helmut Kohl, Germany’s foreign po-
licy in the Baltics was rather passive. This trend continued as Gerhard 
Schroeder assumed office as Chancellor. [9, р. 195] The passivity of Ger-
many’s foreign policy towards the Baltics is explained by its subordinate 
relationship to Germany’s more global eastern policy governed by the ‘Rus-
sia-first’ principle. Therefore, Germany’s foreign policy in the region was very 
pragmatic from the start. It was based on the Realpolitik paradigm — the Bal-
tics were not to threaten German-Russian relations under any circumstances.  
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However, after the advocates of NATO enlargement had defeated the 
proponents of the ‘Russia-First’ policy in President Clinton’s administration 
in the mid-1990s, the US actively supported the Baltics’ NATO ambitions in 
the first round of enlargement. [2, S. 60] This increased pressure on the 
German government. As a result, the US nudged Germany into changes in 
its position on the Baltics’ NATO membership. At the same time, the gov-
ernment of the Federative Republic supported the idea of synchronising the 
EU and NATO enlargement processes. Germany’s leadership believed that 
parallel enlargement would appease Russia (which opposed the enlargement 
of the Alliance) and accelerate European cooperation in foreign policy and 
security. Factors that expedited the decision about the Baltics’ accession to 
NATO were both the softening of Russia’s position and the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, which forced Russia and the US to cooperate more closely in the 
fight against terrorism and compelled NATO to revise its strategy towards 
enlargement. Germany’s position was also affected by the dramatic events in 
the Balkans. As the civil war in Yugoslavia raged on, Gerhard Schroeder’s 
government felt obliged to take measures to ensure stability in the Baltics, 
where ethnic conflict potential was also rather high. 
A dramatic change in Germany’s position on the Baltic’s accession to 
NATO occurred in April 2002, when the Bundestag opposition seized the 
initiative and demanded that the government support the accession of the 
Baltics to NATO at the Alliance’s conference in Prague. [1, S. 275] Several 
days later, the German government declared its support for the enlargement. 
At the Prague summit in November 2002, the Baltic Republics were offi-
cially invited to the accession talks. An important security objective of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was almost attained and the major differences 
in the Baltic-German relations were technically resolved. 
After the Baltics’ accession to NATO in March 2004 and the EU in May 
2004, the relations between Germany and the Baltic States reached a new 
level — they became equal partners in Euro-Atlantic organisations. How-
ever, this fact seemed to discourage cooperation between the Baltics and 
Germany even further, since their interests within the mentioned organisa-
tions were diverging. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are fairly satisfied with 
their current participation in the European institution and they are not inter-
ested in further European integration, which is supported by Germany. 
In the 2000s, the German-Baltic relations deteriorated against the back-
drop of the project launched by the Russian-German company Nord-Stream 
to construct a natural gas pipeline, which was designed to secure supply of 
Russian gas to German and European consumers. The Baltics viewed the 
construction of the Nord Stream a threat to their security. Thus, the project 
faced stiff opposition from the Baltics at the preparation stage. Baltic politi-
cians regularly complained that their position was ignored by Russia and 
Germany. They even compared the pipeline construction project with the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, hinting at another ‘division’ of the Baltics be-
tween Russia and Germany. [6, P. 72] The most active position was taken by 
Estonia, which refused to admit the chair of the Nord Stream’s board of di-
rectors, ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and to discuss Finland’s recom-
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mendations concerning the pipeline route running through the Estonian eco-
nomic zone of the Gulf of Finland. In September of the same year, the Esto-
nian Party did not allow the Nord Stream to explore the country’s section of 
the seafloor. [13] Nevertheless, despite the opposition of the Baltics, the 
pipeline was built and put into operation on November 8, 2011. 
Although Germany played a key role on the Baltics’ international rela-
tions, the fixation of the latter on trans-Atlantic relations and differences 
over the taxation policy suggest that Germany and the Baltics have not 
forged a close political partnership. [1, S. 23] The relations between the Bal-
tics and Russia, with which Germany developed mutually beneficial relation, 
were also complicated. The confrontation between the Baltics and Russia 
puts Germany in a difficult situation, since, on the one hand, it cannot ignore 
the interests of its NATO and EU partners, on the other, the country is inter-
ested in maintaining and improving relations with Russia. However, the 
tragic events that took place in Ukraine in February 2014 and Russia’s in-
corporation of Crimea had an adverse effect on the relations between Russia 
and the West. Germany’s political elite was increasingly supportive of the 
Baltics in the Russian-Baltic confrontation. In March 2015, during his visit 
to Tallinn, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
stressed that the Baltics could rely on NATO and the EU (http://www.ves.lv/ 
rus/politika/glava-mid-germanii-strany-baltii-mogut-polozhitsya-na-nato-i-es/). 
It seems that under pressure from its NATO allies, Germany was forced to 
provide considerable assistance to the NATO members from Central and 
Eastern Europe, including the Baltics. [14] According to the article pub-
lished in the Spiegel in March 2105, Germany plans to make available six 
aircraft for a strengthened air-patrolling mission. [15] In a short- and mid-
term perspective, Germany’s policy in the Baltic Sea region will be coordi-
nated with its NATO and EU partners more carefully than before the 
Ukraine events. It means that in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Baltic dimension receives stronger support than the pro-Russian one. 
 
The preparation of this article was supported by a grant from the Russian 
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